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BOOK REVIEW
SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY: TALES OF YANKEE POWER,
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF ECONOMY BY CARTEL IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
CLIFFORD A. JONES*
Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delin-
quency. Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. 230, $74.00 (Hardcover).
Christopher Harding and Julian Joshua's Regulating Cartels in
Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency (Regulating
Cartels) is a significant and well-written book that deserves to be
widely read by scholars, practitioners, and students in the United
States as well as in Europe and other jurisdictions with antitrust
laws. For those readers to whom European Community (E.C.)
competition law remains largely a mystery,1 this book also serves as
a good introduction to the European system because of its detailed
description in the cartel context of the development of the Euro-
pean Community's substantive and procedural rules for handling
enforcement of several varieties of competition law offenses,
including judicial review and what Europeans call "rights of the
defence."2
* Visiting Lecturer, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Ph.D. 1997, M.Phil.
1995, University of Cambridge; J.D. 1977, University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.A.
1974, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.
1. A shrinking number, one hopes, in view of European Community (E.C.) competi-
ion law decisions in the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas and GE/Honeywell mergers, not to
mention the March 24, 2004 decision fining Microsoft C497 million (approximately U.S.
$612 million) for tying and abuse of dominant position in the personal computer operat-
ing system market. See EU Rapid Press Release No. IP/04/382 (March 24, 2004), available
at http://www.cec.eu.int. The Commission's full opinion is available on the Commission's
website, COMMISSION DECISION of 24.03.2004 relating to a proceeding under Article 82
of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), Commission Document C(2004)
900 final.
2. The European concept of "rights of the defence" broadly correlates to U.S. con-
cepts of procedural due process. For example, it includes the right (even of corporations)
against self-incrimination, the right of access by target companies to the European Com-
mission's file of evidence on which proposed enforcement action is based, and the right to
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One attribute of the book that is particularly valuable to an
American or other non-European audience is its comparative treat-
ment 3 of the historical, cultural, and philosophic underpinnings of
the "cartel offence" in Europe and the United States. The "cartel
offence" is a general reference to antitrust offenses generally
regarded as the most serious of those engaged in by cartels. They
include violations such as price-fixing, market-sharing, limiting
supply or production, or bid-rigging. In the United States, at least,
these activities would all be considered per se violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, and defenses based on any alleged reasona-
bleness of the conduct would not be heard. These offenses are
consistently and widely condemned on an international basis.4
Harding and Joshua present an interesting etymology5 of the
term "cartel," which is known to traditional international lawyers
(and a few others) 6 as the negotiated truce in wartime convention-
ally used for the exchange during hostilities of prisoners of war.
Historically, the cartel was an agreement to suspend hostilities, and
this definition echoes in the "modern pejorative meaning of 'car-
tel' as an arrangement of truce, whereby natural rivals come
together in uneasy alliance. ' 7 This connotation follows from an
earlier meaning on the European continent of the "cartel of chiv-
alry," originally referring to "the terms of a combat" and later "sim-
ply the challenge" to engage in combat" Harding and Joshua refer
to cartel participants as "sleeping with the enemy"9 to capture the
ambiguous relationship of intimacy and hostility reflected when
an oral hearing. See generally Julian M. Joshua, The Right to be Heard in EEC Competition
Procedures, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 16 (1992); CHRISTOPHER KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCE-
DURE (4th ed. 1998); Commission, Notice on Internal Rules of Procedure for Processing
Requests for Access to the File, OJ. 1997, C 23/3.
3. CHRISTOPHER HARDING &JULIANJOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY
OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 39-60 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council Rec-
ommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/FINAL (April,
1998); Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.); see also HARDING &JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 30-31.
5. HARDING &JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 11-16.
6. See, e.g., PATRICK O'BRIEN, MASTER AND COMMANDER (1970) (one of O'Brien's
twenty wonderful tales of the British Navy during the period of the Napoleonic wars, in
which the "cartel" is a naval shuttle maintaining communication in a discreet truce
between Britain and France, even though Napoleon flouted tradition by refusing to
exchange prisoners during the wars).
7. HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at xxiii; see also id. at 12-13.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 9. A note regarding popular culture: Sleeping with the Enemy was a film star-
ringJulia Roberts and Patrick Bergin, in which Bergin played a husband plotting to kill his
wife.
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competitors become bedfellows for economic gain at the expense
of the public.
On both sides of the Atlantic, "cartel" now refers to business
competitors engaged in the most egregious forms of antitrust viola-
tions, such as price-fixing, market allocation, and bid-rigging.
Under U.S. antitrust law, these are per se offenses, in that business
or economic justifications for the conduct are so unlikely to suffice
that they seldom will be considered by courts. 10 The U.S. Supreme
Court long ago announced that the federal courts will not deter-
mine whether prices fixed by conspiracy or agreement in lieu of
market forces were reasonable prices; such prices were per se
unreasonable not because of their level but because they were
fixed.11
Harding and Joshua trace the development of cartel regulation
in Europe, drawing on a comparative analysis of their treatment of
cartels in the United States. The contrast helps to highlight the
economic, cultural, philosophical, and legal differences in the per-
ception of the desirability of condemning cartels. In the United
States public outrage over the rapacious Standard Oil Trust and
others in the late 1880s led to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890.12 In Europe cartels were viewed favorably as engines
of industrial development driving the economic growth of Europe,
especially in Germany.13 Indeed, cartels were respected economic
institutions, and economy by cartel was the rule in Europe prior to
1945.14 Harding andJoshua review some relatively unknown litera-
ture on the behavior of European cartels and paint a broad,
detailed picture of cartel history from private systems of transna-
tional trade regulation to government-encouraged market stabiliza-
tion, to the compulsory cartelization in Nazi Germany, to
international commodity agreements. This history helps to explain
10. But see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1,
23-24 (1979) (holding that the issuance of blanket licenses to perform copyrighted music
did not amount to a per se price fixing violation under the Sher-man Act). The Court
appeared to retreat from this view one year later, however, in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (holding that an agreement among competitors that is
"plainly anticompetitive" is price-fixing and is thus presumptively illegal).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
12. CLIFFORD A. JONES, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW IN THE EU, UK, AND
USA 7-8 nn.20 & 27 (1999).
13. See generally CLIVE TREBILCOCK, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE CONTINENTAL POW-
ERs 1780-1914 (1981).
14. Harm G. Schr6ter, Cartelization and Decartelization in Europe, 1870-1995: Rise and
Decline of an Economic Institution, 25J. EUROPEAN EcON. HIST. 129, 137 (1996); see alsOJONES,
supra note 12, at 23-28.
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why the culture of competition represented by U.S. antitrust law
has never been as completely accepted in Europe, which has always
had more socialist and even Communist governments and indus-
try. Europe is known for its pervasive cartel tradition and an histor-
ical lack of enthusiasm for vigorous competition on the part of
business, government, and even consumers. 15 Harding and Joshua
chronicle this attitudinal change, which has occurred over the past
fifty years and changed the regulatory view of cartels in Europe
from a positive one to the negative view long held in the United
States. From the standpoint of European business that might
engage in cartels, the victory remains somewhat incomplete, as
noted by the authors' suggestion that a cartel culture remains in
European business.' 6
Supporters of cartels-whether private, government-encour-
aged, or government-mandated-have traditionally justified them
in part based on alleged need to stabilize employment and mar-
kets, especially in situations of excess capacity and overproduction.
The underlying notion was that vigorous competition among firms
faced with a "crisis" of low demand and excess capacity and produc-
tion would force one or more firms out of business and result in
unemployment and economic and social hardship for workers. 17
Under this view, it would be preferable for firms to share markets
and hold prices up in order to prevent increased unemployment
and other adverse economic consequences.' 8 Such social policies
have been used in both Europe and Japan to jusify exemptions
from antitrust rules, but this has never really been the case in the
United States. 19 The closest the U.S. Supreme Court has come to
recognizing permissible "crisis cartels" was its decision to legitimize
ajoint coal-selling arrangement during the Depression in Appalach-
15. See Clifford A. Jones, A New Dawn for Private Competition Law Remedies in Europe?
Reflections from the USA, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2001: EFFECTIVE PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 95, 96 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu
eds., 2003); see alsoJONES, supra note 12, at 23-28.
16. HARDING &JOSHUA, supra note 3, 45, 275-77.
17. For discussion of the concept of crisis cartels, see D.G. GoYDER, EC COMPETITION
LAW 151-53 (4th ed. 2003); RICHARD WIISH, COMPETITION LAw 132 (4th ed. 2001); HAR-
DING &JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 146-47.
18. HARDING &JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 42.
19. Cf. id. at 75-77, 274-76.
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ian Coals.20 The Appalachian Coals case is considered an aberration,
however, and was effectively overruled in Socony.21
The Allied occupation of Germany following World War II
included a decartelization plan.22 When the "Schuman Plan" for
the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
precursor to the current European Community and European
Union, was presented to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson on
May 7, 1950, Acheson's first reaction was fear that the plan was a
clever cover for a "gigantic European cartel."23 As Harding and
Joshua note:
IT]he ECSC then substituted a supranational system of exten-
sive public management. Part of the latter entailed the ability of
the new supranational body, the High Authority [later the Com-
mission], to require conformity with arrangements reminiscent
of a conventional business cartel. Article 58 of the ECSC Treaty
enabled the High Authority to impose production quotas in
response to crisis conditions or decline in demand. Article 61
allowed the High Authority to fix maximum and minimum
prices. Article 63 enabled the High Authority to specify condi-
20. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Ajoint coal-selling
arrangement could be viewed as a "rationalization" measure to ensure that each member
shares in the sales being made, thus sharing the business among competitors to prevent
failure of one or more due to "ruinous" competition.
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). In Socony-Vacuum,
the Court held that any tampering with pricing structures interfered with the "free play of
market forces" and that the Sherman Act "places all such schemes beyond the pale ....
Congress has not left us with the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing
schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive." Id. at 221. Hence, rationalization or
crises cartels are not justified under the Sherman Act.
22. "On March 14, 1951, the Allied decartelization plan finally secured Adenauer's
agreement, and Hallstein at once accepted the two Treaty Articles that were still in dispute.
They had been drafted by Robert Bowie, with meticulous care. For Europe, they were a
fundamental innovation: the extensive anti-trust legislation now applied by the European
Community essentially derives from those few lines in the Schuman Treaty." JEAN MONNET,
MEMOIRS 352-53 (Richard Mayne trans., 1978). See HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at
86-87.
23. DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: My YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
383 (1969); DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION?: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 23 (1994). Acheson feared objections by the Antitrust Division, which took a
dim view of cartels controlling essential war material in light of then recent experience
with the powerful cartelized German economy. ACHESON, supra, at 383. The now-defunct
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) placed coal and steel in the then six Mem-
ber States (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) under
the supranational control of the High Authority in order to make war impossible. The coal
and steel industries of the members were essentially administered by the High Authority as
to production, allocation, employment, pricing, and quotas. JOHN PINnER, THE BUILDING
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3-8 (3d ed. 1998). Coal and steel now generally fall under the
general EC Treaty. SeeJo SHAw, EUROPEAN UNION LAw § 1.2 (3d ed. 2000).
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tions of sale. To that extent the ECSC organized coal and steel
producers into a kind of public cartel. 24
Although Acheson's concerns were satisfied by the inclusion of
antitrust rules in the Treaty and the plan went forward, the history
of cartels in Europe to that point would have supported Acheson's
initial reluctance. The history of German and other European car-
tels is recounted in some detail by Harding and Joshua.25 Indeed,
the first vigorous antitrust enforcement in Europe, and particularly
in Germany, was carried out under the Allied decartelization plan
beginning in 1947 and expanding in scope in 1950 shortly before
the ECSC Treaty was agreed.26
At least among European businesses, this radical change in legal
treatment of cartels did not receive full acceptance then or even
now. As late as 1980, one Dutch commentator expressed a nostal-
gic longing for the good old days of respectable cartels:
And now I expect, but I sincerely do not hope, that this second
time that Western civilization is seriously endangered since the
eighth century when Rome crumbled under the victorious
Islam, that the second time will bring to light that the Sherman
Act and Article 85 [Now Article 81 of the EC Treaty] are luxu-
ries, the fundamental errors of which are not felt in a fast-grow-
ing economy but that they are an obstacle to a society which
should be based on solidarity and regard for others. In my
country, before the [former Article] 85 [now 81] men on horse-
back came galloping in, we did not speak about competitors; we
spoke about "colleagues". I feel that we shall have to face the
oncoming economic war not with competitor competitori lupus,27
but with the concepts I just evoked-solidarity and regard for
others. 28
Much of Regulating Cartels traces the substantive legal and proce-
dural developments case-by-case as the European Commission
gradually enforced the E.C. antitrust rules (primarily Articles 81
and 82 of the E.C. Treaty) with increasing vigor and success begin-
ning around 1970, and the resulting changes in the legal climate
for cartels in Europe. In the current climate, when European
Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti speaks of cartels as
"cancers on the open market economy"29 and Director-General for
24. HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 94.
25. Id. at 63-82. For developments in other European countries, see id. at 84-113.
See also TREBILCOCK, supra note 13; Schr6ter, supra note 14.
26. HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 86-87.
27. As translated by the author, roughly, competitors competing as wolves, for exam-
ple, "dog-eat-dog."
28. JONEs, sup-a note 12, at 28.
29. HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 277.
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Competition Philip Lowe comments that "we have only touched
the tip of the iceberg in terms of our attack on cartels,"3°1 it is clear
that a major shift in social and economic culture has occurred in
the direction of the longstanding U.S. antipathy toward cartels.
Concerning this paradigm shift toward the U.S. view of cartels,
Harding and Joshua ask: "Is this a tale of conversion to, or at least a
successful exportation of, the American model-tales of Yankee
power? Or is it a tale of late-twentieth-century globalization, involv-
ing an internationalization and harmonization of legal policy and
regulatory method?" 31 The answer seems more toward the notion
of successful export of the American model, but not exactly "Yan-
kee power." The authors conclude that U.S. international cartel
prosecution has energized other antitrust agencies-including
those agencies located in the European Union-but that enforce-
ment for the foreseeable future is likely to remain national in
nature rather than becoming internationalized and harmonized. 32
The authors reach this conclusion because the increase in enforce-
ment by the United States in particular has resulted in large part
from the increase in effectiveness of the national enforcement
mechanisms3 - and their application to international cartels. For
example, the Clinton Administration announced a focus on cases
having large volumes of commerce, for example, international car-
tel cases, and in one period, 1996-1999, this resulted in seventy-six
percent of fines imposed by the U.S. Justice Department coming
from firms based outside the United States. 34
The authors are skeptical that international cooperation agree-
ments can be fully effective because of practical limitations, such as
the inability of national enforcement agencies-due to national
privacy rules-to share confidential information with officials of
antitrust enforcement agencies in foreign countries. 35 Increased
international cooperation of the "pick up the phone" variety is on
the rise, but Harding andJoshua do not perceive bilateral coopera-
tion in enforcement as yet able to replace national efforts. This is
correct, since bilateral cooperation agreements are merely proce-
dural in nature and require national enforcement authorities to do
30. Interview with Philip Lowe, European Commission, Director General, DG Compe-
tition (Sept. 25, 2003), at http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/Interviews/200309/26545d22-8f
11-46b2-abb2-cfd2029e0f4b.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
31. HARDING& JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 270.
32. Id. at 289-90.
33. Id. at 287.
34. Id. at 285.
35. Id. at 288.
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the heavy lifting.3 6 Harding and Joshua cite the innovation by the
United States of criminal leniency programs (getting cartel mem-
bers to turn state's evidence in exchange for lenient treatment),
the remarkable success of such programs, and the adoption of sim-
ilar programs in the European Union and other jurisdictions as all
indicative of increased effectiveness of national exercise ofjurisdic-
tion but not necessarily of internationalization of anti-cartel law.37
The authors see no harmonization of international rules of sub-
stantive anti-cartel law, procedural law, or international enforce-
ment agencies or tribunals on the horizon. 38
It seems likely that Harding and Joshua are correct in the sense
that internationalization of cartel enforcement means harmonized
law and international agencies or tribunals. Outside the European
Union, and NAFTA to a lesser extent, national sovereignty interests
would appear to preclude truly international agencies or tribunals
for a considerable period of time.39 A hybrid form of multina-
tional enforcement, however, remains a possible outcome of inter-
national negotiations now underway. Since the Singapore
Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 1996, various countries-at the prompting of the European
Union-have worked toward inclusion of antitrust rules in some
form under the WTO agreement. 40 Agreement was reached to
place the issue on the agenda for the Doha Round of WTO negoti-
ations,4' and the Doha Declaration stated that negotiations on that
topic would begin at a time to be specified during the Round.42
The Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003 broke up with-
out agreement, however, and the status of the negotiations is
unclear at the time of this Review. Whatever happens on the inter-
national front in the near future will most likely take place in other
fora, such as the International Competition Network (ICN).
36. See Clifford A. Jones, Global Antitrust in the Millenium Round: The Ways Forward, in
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 402 (Clifford A. Jones & M. Matsu-
shita eds., 2002).
37. HARDING & JOSHUA, supra note 3, at 289.
38. Id. at 289-90.
39. SeeJones, supra note 36, at 403 (indicating that national sovereignty concerns have
made adoption of the Draft International Antitrust Code impractical). In the European
Union, the Commission enforces the competition rules in all Member States in addition to
national enforcement with judicial review to the Court of First Instance and the European
Court of Justice. In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the NAFTA
competition rules may be enforced in some cases by the multinational tribunal.
40. See generally COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Clifford A. Jones
& M. Matsushita eds., 2002).
41. Jones, supra note 36, at 397-406.
42. WTO, Draft Ministerial Declaration, WVT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/I (Nov. 14, 2001).
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The ICN is an organization of national antitrust enforcement
agencies founded in 2001 that works to develop international stan-
dards and best practices guidelines for antitrust enforcement agen-
cies throughout the world. It also works to provide technical
assistance and other resources to the many new and inexperienced
antitrust agencies in the world. Its first project has resulted in a set
of international merger guidelines and best practices in the merger
field.43 The ICN had its genesis in the report of the U.S. Attorney
General's International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
(ICPAC),44 and this recommendation was subsequently adopted by
then-Assistant U.S. AttorneyJoel Klein and agreed to by E.U. Com-
petition Commissioner Monti. 45 The ICN is not an international
enforcement agency or tribunal; it attempts to obtain convergence
through "soft" measures such as best practices guidelines.
The present combination of extraterritorial application of the
antitrust laws and international cooperation-most visible in the
cases of the United States, the European Union, and Japan 46-will
continue to be the major tool of international antitrust enforce-
ment for perhaps the next decade. Beyond that, negotiations at
the WTO and perhaps in the ICN may produce at least the begin-
nings of true international antitrust enforcement. The European
Union has demonstrated the value of supranational antitrust
enforcement and may yet be a model for organizing international
antitrust on a global basis.
Harding's and Joshua's book is a valuable introduction to Euro-
pean competition law in general and cartel enforcement in partic-
ular. Given that as of May 1, 2004, E.U. competition rules were
harmonized law in over thirty countries47-representing about
one-third of all the countries in the world with antitrust laws-the
subject is ripe for attention.
43. See International Competition Network, Guiding Principles and Recommended
Practices for Merger Notification and Review, at http://www.internationalcompetitionnet
work.org/guidingprinciples.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
44. Final Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the
Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (2000), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
45. Jones, supra note 36, at 400-01.
46. The United States has formal antitrust cooperation agreements with the Euro-
pean Union and Japan, among others. The European Union has also entered into an
antitrust enforcement cooperation agreement with Japan. With regard to cross-border
mergers and cartels, these are the three most active antitrust jurisdictions in the world.
47. Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a
Global Market, 16 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 409, 417 (2004).
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